Synthese

, Volume 188, Issue 2, pp 217–230

The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism

Authors

    • University of New South Wales
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9924-6

Cite this article as:
Hetherington, S. Synthese (2012) 188: 217. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9924-6

Abstract

Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.

Keywords

Gettier cases Knowledge Safety Gettier Duncan Pritchard Justified true belief Infallibilism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011