On “Epistemic Permissiveness”
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In “Epistemic Permissiveness”, Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one’s total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe ∼P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White’s arguments and then argue that they do not succeed.
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- White R. (2005) Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Issues 15: 445–459
- On “Epistemic Permissiveness”
Volume 188, Issue 2 , pp 165-177
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