, Volume 188, Issue 2, pp 165–177

On “Epistemic Permissiveness”


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9921-9

Cite this article as:
Brueckner, A. & Bundy, A. Synthese (2012) 188: 165. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9921-9


In “Epistemic Permissiveness”, Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one’s total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe ∼P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White’s arguments and then argue that they do not succeed.


EpistemologyRationalityPermissivenessUniquenessRoger White

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of CaliforniaSanta BarbaraUSA