, Volume 188, Issue 2, pp 145–163

Belief control and intentionality


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3

Cite this article as:
Steup, M. Synthese (2012) 188: 145. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3


In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston’s defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.


BeliefCompatibilismDeciding to believeDoxastic attitudesDoxastic voluntarismIntentionalityLibertarianismVolitionsVoluntary control

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Purdue UniversityWest LafayetteUSA