Synthese

, Volume 188, Issue 2, pp 145–163

Belief control and intentionality

Authors

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3

Cite this article as:
Steup, M. Synthese (2012) 188: 145. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston’s defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.

Keywords

Belief Compatibilism Deciding to believe Doxastic attitudes Doxastic voluntarism Intentionality Libertarianism Volitions Voluntary control

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011