Synthese

, Volume 185, Issue 1, pp 125–144

Life without definitions

Authors

    • Department of Philosophy, Center for AstrobiologyUniversity of Colorado
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9879-7

Cite this article as:
Cleland, C.E. Synthese (2012) 185: 125. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9879-7

Abstract

The question ‘what is life?’ has long been a source of philosophical debate and in recent years has taken on increasing scientific importance. The most popular approach among both philosophers and scientists for answering this question is to provide a “definition” of life. In this article I explore a variety of different definitional approaches, both traditional and non-traditional, that have been used to “define” life. I argue that all of them are deeply flawed. It is my contention that a scientifically compelling understanding of the nature of life presupposes an empirically adequate scientific theory (vs. definition) of life; as I argue, scientific theories are not the sort of thing that can be encapsulated in definitions. Unfortunately, as I also discuss, scientists are currently in no position to formulate even a tentative version of such a theory. Recent discoveries in biology and biochemistry have revealed that familiar Earth life represents a single example that may not be representative of life. If this is the case, life on Earth today provides an empirically inadequate foundation for theorizing about life considered generally. I sketch a strategy for procuring the needed additional examples of life without the guidance of a definition or theory of life, and close with an application to NASA’s fledgling search for extraterrestrial life.

Keywords

LifeDefinitionTheoryTheoretical identityNatural kindsAnomalies

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011