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Vagueness and revision sequences

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Abstract

Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.

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  1. School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    C. M. Asmus

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  1. C. M. Asmus
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Correspondence to C. M. Asmus.

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Asmus, C.M. Vagueness and revision sequences. Synthese 190, 953–974 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0052-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0052-0

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