, Volume 179, Issue 3, pp 409–433

In defence of virtue epistemology


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y

Cite this article as:
Kelp, C. Synthese (2011) 179: 409. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y


In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology’s central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard’s objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.


KnowledgeAchievementVirtue epistemologyPritchard

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LeuvenLeuvenBelgium