, Volume 173, Issue 1, pp 25–39

Antirealism and universal knowability


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9674-x

Cite this article as:
Hand, M. Synthese (2010) 173: 25. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9674-x


Truth’s universal knowability entails its discovery. This threatens antirealism, which is thought to require it. Fortunately, antirealism is not committed to it. Avoiding it requires adoption (and extension) of Dag Prawitz’s position in his long-term disagreement with Michael Dummett on the notion of provability involved in intuitionism’s identification of it with truth. Antirealism (intuitionism generalized) must accommodate a notion of lost-opportunity truth (a kind of recognition-transcendent truth), and even truth consisting in the presence of unperformable verifications. Dummett’s position cannot abide this, while Prawitz’s can. Antirealism’s epistemic notion of truth derives from general features of its meaning theory, not from a universal knowability principle.


Antirealism Dummett Prawitz knowability 

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTexas A&M UniversityCollege StationUSA