Synthese

, Volume 172, Issue 1, pp 129–143

Decision science: from Ramsey to dual process theories

Authors

    • Department of Medical EthicsLund University
  • Annika Wallin
    • Cognitive Science, Department of PhilosophySwedish Collegium for Advanced Study
  • Johannes Persson
    • Department of PhilosophyLund University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9472-5

Cite this article as:
Sahlin, N., Wallin, A. & Persson, J. Synthese (2010) 172: 129. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9472-5

Abstract

The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, lack a firm conceptual framework, and have no means of producing independent evidence for their case.

Keywords

Decision theoryDecision scienceDecision-makingHuman reasoningDual process theoryRationalityProspect theoryExpected utilityNormative manEconomic manRational angelRamsey

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009