, Volume 166, Issue 2, pp 309–331

Trumping assessments and the aristotelian future


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9282-6

Cite this article as:
Moruzzi, S. & Wright, C. Synthese (2009) 166: 309. doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9282-6


In the paper we argue that truth-relativism is potentially hostage to a problem of exhibiting witnesses of its own truth. The problem for the relativist stems from acceptance of a trumping principle according to which there is a dependency between ascriptions of truth of an utterance and ascriptions of truth to other ascriptions of truth of that utterance. We argue that such a dependency indeed holds in the case of future contingents and the case of epistemic modals and that, consequently, the relativist about these domains cannot exhibit witnesses to his relativism. In the appendix we provide some results on the relation between trumping and multi-order relativism.


Truth-relativism Future contingents Epistemic modals Multi-order relativism Trumping 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arché AHRC Philosophical Research CentreUniversity of St. AndrewsSt. AndrewsScotland
  2. 2.University of BolognaBolognaItaly
  3. 3.Department of PhilosophyNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA