The reference class problem is your problem too
 Alan Hájek
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The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference class problem. Other versions of these interpretations apparently evade the problem. But I contend that they are all “notheory” theories of probability  accounts that leave quite obscure why probability should function as a guide to life, a suitable basis for rational inference and action. The reference class problem besets those theories that are genuinely informative and that plausibly constrain our inductive reasonings and decisions.
I distinguish a “metaphysical” and an “epistemological” reference class problem. I submit that we can dissolve the former problem by recognizing that probability is fundamentally a twoplace notion: conditional probability is the proper primitive of probability theory. However, I concede that the epistemological problem remains.
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 Title
 The reference class problem is your problem too
 Journal

Synthese
Volume 156, Issue 3 , pp 563585
 Cover Date
 20070601
 DOI
 10.1007/s1122900691385
 Print ISSN
 00397857
 Online ISSN
 15730964
 Publisher
 Kluwer Academic Publishers
 Additional Links
 Topics
 Keywords

 Probability
 Conditional probability
 Reference class problem
 Frequentist
 Classical
 Logical
 Propensity
 Subjectivist interpretations of probability
 Kolmogorov
 Popper
 Industry Sectors
 Authors

 Alan Hájek ^{(1)}
 Author Affiliations

 1. Research School of the Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia