Synthese

, Volume 156, Issue 3, pp 473–489

Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9134-9

Cite this article as:
Fitelson, B. Synthese (2007) 156: 473. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9134-9

Abstract

Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a “middle way” between Likelihoodism and Bayesianism. In the process, I will propose some new work for an old probability puzzle: the “Monty Hall” problem.

Keywords

Confirmation Support Favoring Likelihood Bayesian Monty Hall 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaBerkelyUSA