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Weak Bayesian coherentism

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Abstract

Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.

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Correspondence to Michael Huemer.

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Huemer, M. Weak Bayesian coherentism. Synthese 157, 337–346 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9059-3

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