Studia Logica

, 92:395

Fibred Security Language

  • Guido Boella
  • Dov M. Gabbay
  • Valerio Genovese
  • Leendert van der Torre
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11225-009-9201-6

Cite this article as:
Boella, G., Gabbay, D.M., Genovese, V. et al. Stud Logica (2009) 92: 395. doi:10.1007/s11225-009-9201-6

Abstract

We study access control policies based on the says operator by introducing a logical framework called Fibred Security Language (FSL) which is able to deal with features like joint responsibility between sets of principals and to identify them by means of first-order formulas. FSL is based on a multimodal logic methodology. We first discuss the main contributions from the expressiveness point of view, we give semantics for the language both for classical and intuitionistic fragment), we then prove that in order to express well-known properties like ‘speaks-for’ or ‘hand-off’, defined in terms of says, we do not need second-order logic (unlike previous approaches) but a decidable fragment of first-order logic suffices. We propose a model-driven study of the says axiomatization by constraining the Kripke models in order to respect desirable security properties, we study how existing access control logics can be translated into FSL and we give completeness for the logic.

Keywords

Logic Fibring Access Control Language-based Security Trust Management 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guido Boella
    • 1
  • Dov M. Gabbay
    • 2
    • 3
  • Valerio Genovese
    • 1
  • Leendert van der Torre
    • 4
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversità di TorinoTorinoItaly
  2. 2.Dept. of Computer ScienceKing’s College LondonLondonUK
  3. 3.Dept. of Computer ScienceBar Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael
  4. 4.Faculty of Sciences, Technology and Communication (FSTC)University of LuxembourgLuxembourgLuxembourg

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