Studia Logica

, Volume 90, Issue 3, pp 291–312

Supervaluationism and Logical Consequence: A Third Way


DOI: 10.1007/s11225-008-9154-1

Cite this article as:
Cobreros, P. Stud Logica (2008) 90: 291. doi:10.1007/s11225-008-9154-1


It is often assumed that the supervaluationist theory of vagueness is committed to a global notion of logical consequence, in contrast with the local notion characteristic of modal logics. There are, at least, two problems related to the global notion of consequence. First, it brings some counterexamples to classically valid patterns of inference. Second, it is subject to an objection related to higher-order vagueness. This paper explores a third notion of logical consequence, and discusses its adequacy for the supervaluationist theory. The paper proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the paper provides a deductive notion of consequence for global validity using the tableaux method. In the second step, the paper provides a notion of logical consequence which is an alternative to global validity, and discusses i) whether it is acceptable to the supervaluationist and ii) whether it plays a better role in a theory of vagueness in the face of the problems related to the global notion.


SupervaluationismVaguenessLogical ConsequenceTruth

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of NavarraPamplonaSpain