Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover
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We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO.
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- Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
Volume 29, Issue 3 , pp 315-338
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- Executive compensation
- CEO turnover
- Compensation structure
- Firm performance
- Industry Sectors