Abstract
The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P1 at time T1 is numerically identical with a person P2 at a later time T2, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views.
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Notes
Going forward, uses of ‘same’, ‘identical’, and related expressions should be understood in the numerical sense and references to the problem of personal identity refer to the problem of diachronic identity, unless otherwise specified.
When I say there is a ‘chain of overlapping X-continuity linking P1 and P2’, I mean that there are various person stages between P1 and P2 and at each junction between stages the adjacent stages can be said to have the same relevant feature X (in this case, the soul) (see, e.g., Parfit 1984, p. 206).
Introductory texts perhaps more frequently mention souls as a solution to the problem of synchronic identity—the question of what makes a person that person at a particular time (see, e.g., Rachels and Rachels 2012, pp. 53–55; Olson 2015, Sect. 1). And as Olson (2007, p. 150) observes, such views come in two basic forms: views on which we are simply souls (which Olson (2007, p. 151) calls ‘immaterialism’) and views on which we are complexes in some way of souls and material bodies (the view defended by Swinburne (1984) and suggested by his quote above). But whatever account we give of synchronic identity, the soul theory as I construe it claims that the soul or soul component of persons explains diachronic identity.
For example, consider this remark: “Souls might seem to provide quick answers to many philosophical perplexities about identity over time, but there is no good reason to believe that they exist” (Conee and Sider 2005, pp. 10–11).
I often write as though a soul inheres in or occupies a body, or that a body possesses a soul, but these expressions are of course a kind of loose talk. Since souls are nonphysical, they do not have spatiotemporal locations, and so cannot be located in a body or anywhere else. What I mean, strictly speaking, is that a soul is paired with or related to that body.
On Swinburne’s subtle view, souls are what he calls ‘pure mental substances’ that possess only ‘pure mental properties’ (see, e.g., 2014, p. 149; cf. 2013, p. 173)—that is, the existence of these substances and properties do not entail the existence of any physical substances or properties. Mental substances are necessary for, and the subject of, thoughts and experiences.
Swinburne writes that “my soul has its own thisness, independently of any thisness possessed by any brain to which it is connected. For clearly my soul could have had a different mental life from the one it had…. Hence the mental substance is not the substance that is in virtue merely of the properties which it has” (2014, p. 151).
I acknowledge that some have argued that thought experiments such as Locke’s are question begging (e.g., Williams 1970). After all, why not think that the cobbler has become insane? My point, however, is not that these scenarios establish a particular criterion as being relevant to personal identity (e.g., psychological-, rather than bodily-, continuity). My point is that Locke’s thought experiment reveals that there is a question about the relevant criterion—and so we need a theory to answer whether or not the cobbler and prince swap bodies. But the soul theory cannot explain what happens in such scenarios.
Locke himself casts the relevant continuity in terms of memory, but it can be understood in broader psychological terms (cf. Parfit 1984, p. 207).
I note that some might nonetheless prefer a soul theory—such as a soul-based multiple-occupant view—for other reasons. For example, they might prefer such a view because only a soul theory can secure life after bodily death. And while that may be a reasonable consideration, notice that such an argument supports a soul theory not on the grounds that it explains ordinary (living) personal identity, but rather that it explains how persons might exist separately from their bodies. But I do not deny that there may be additional reasons to posit nonphysical souls—my point is that souls are not needed to explain personal identity.
I thank Kristopher Phillips for suggesting to me this possible reply.
One might think that this hylomorphic view is inconsistent with the central assumption that I make that souls are nonphysical, but it is not. As so-called property dualists have urged, it is possible that physical objects have nonphysical properties or perhaps that objects are actually metaphysically neutral substrates that have both physical and nonphysical properties (see, e.g., Chalmers 1996).
This is arguably the Mormon conception of the soul that persists after bodily death: “[After bodily death the] soul shall be restored to the body, and the body to the soul; yea, and every limb and joint shall be restored to its body; yea, even a hair of the head shall not be lost; but all things shall be restored to their proper and perfect frame” (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 2013, Alma 40: 23).
I thank Gregory Spendlove for this interesting objection.
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Acknowledgements
I thank Ben Abelson, Ralph Baergen, Carl Levinson, Melissa Norton, Kristopher Phillips, Jim Skidmore, and Russell Wahl for their helpful commentaries on/discussions of this material. I especially thank Gregory Spendlove for his helpful suggestions about how to frame much of this material as well as encouragement for writing the piece.
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Berger, J. A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity. Int J Philos Relig 83, 41–55 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9594-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9594-x