Review of Economics of the Household

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 41–58

Intrahousehold allocation of financial resources: evidence from South Korean individual bank accounts

Household finances

DOI: 10.1007/s11150-007-9004-3

Cite this article as:
Lee, J. & Pocock, M. Rev Econ Household (2007) 5: 41. doi:10.1007/s11150-007-9004-3

Abstract

Using individual bank account data from South Korea, where joint accounts are rare and the legal system emphasizes the individuality of financial transactions, we examine the distribution of financial resources between spouses within households. We find that each member’s share of household savings depends on the balance of bargaining power. We also find that the wife’s bargaining power increases total household savings. The findings deviate from the unitary model.

Keywords

SavingsHousehold bargaining

JEL Classifications

D1E2

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Sam M. Walton College of BusinessUniversity of Arkansas at FayettevilleFayettevilleUSA
  2. 2.Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)BonnGermany
  3. 3.Risk Analysis Division, Office of the Comptroller of the CurrencyWashingtonUSA