Abstract
Big banks pose substantial costs to society in the form of increased systemic risk and government bailouts during crises. So the question is: Should regulators limit the size of banks? To answer this question, regulators need to assess the potential costs of such regulations. If big banks enjoy substantial scale economies (i.e., average costs get lower as bank size increases), limiting the size of banks through regulations may be inefficient and likely to reduce social welfare. However, the literature offers conflicting results regarding the existence of economies of scale for the biggest US banks. We contribute to this literature using a novel approach to estimating nonparametric measures of scale economies and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. For US commercial banks, we find that around 73 % of the top one hundred banks, 98 % of medium and small banks, and seven of the top ten biggest banks by asset size exhibit substantial economies of scale. Likewise, we find that scale economies contribute positively and significantly to their TFP growth. The existence of substantial scale economies raises an important challenge for regulators to pursue size limit regulations.
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Notes
See Johnson (2012) and the references therein.
We model the unobserved heterogeneity across banks as additive fixed-effects. This is the standard approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity in parametric models (see Chamberlain 1984; Arellano and Honore 2001, and Bai 2009). Ignoring additive unobserved heterogeneity might lead to bias and inconsistency (see Mester 1997; Greene 2005a, b; Kumbhakar et al. 2008, and Wang and Ho 2010). However, input prices and outputs can vary systematically as a function of input characteristics and bank business models, which may vary across banks. So input prices and outputs can have different meaning across different banks, and not all of these variations will necessarily be captured in the bank fixed-effects. Further, unobserved heterogeneity can also be due to differences in costly risk-taking among banks. Note that in addition to controlling for additive fixed bank-specific effects, in our preferred model we allow the “core” technology to be nonparametric which allows full flexibility regarding the marginal effects of input prices and outputs. Since these effects are both bank and year-specific, differences in input prices and outputs among banks are fully captured by the nonparametric specification of the technology. In addition, we control for output quality (through nonperfoming loans), risk (via equity), and nontraditional activities (via noninterest income) to capture heterogeneity across banks that may be confounded with differing relative costs (e.g. Mester 1996; Rogers 1998) or masquerade sources of risk (e.g. Hughes and Mester 1998).
Following the literature, we classify big banks as those with assets above $1 billion dollars; medium banks as those with assets greater than $100 million and lower than $1 billion dollars; and small banks as those with assets below $100 million dollars. For each year, we also rank banks by assets and select the top 100 biggest banks. As of December 31, 2010; there were 479 big banks; 3637 medium banks; and 2290 small banks operating in the US. By comparison, as of December 31, 2000, there were 285 big banks; 2397 medium banks; and 5452 small banks. All nominal variables are in 2005 dollars.
The banks belonging to the top one hundred banks have assets ranging from $23 million to $1.5 million.
The top ten biggest banks for each year are: State Street Bank and Trust Company, CitiBank, US Bank, Wachovia, HSBC, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Fleet National Bank, Suntrust Bank, Keybank, PNC Bank, Regions Bank, JP Morgan Chase, and Citizens Bank.
Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar (2013) using data for all US commercial banks from 2001 to 2010 also document constant RTS for most banks in their sample.
The results for large banks are comparable to those in Feng and Serletis (2010).
Using both the SPG and PG models, we avoid the incidental parameter problem. Consistency of the functional coefficients follow from the standard SPSC model (Li et al. 2002) and the standard linear panel data models as the number of observations grow to infinity.
We use quarterly averages for balance-sheet figures only since end-of-year balance-sheet figures may differ from the average balance-sheet amounts a bank maintains over the year. For instance, if during the first three quarters a bank has $1 Billion in outstanding loans but this amount is reduced significantly in the fourth quarter to $800 million, the end-of-year amount will underestimate the total amount of loans that contributed to generate the reported interest income. In the case of balance-sheet figures used to estimate input prices, using end-of-year as opposed to quarterly averages, will lead to over-estimate them. To clarify, the approach used is to sum up the end-of-quarter figures within a specific year and divide the result by 4. We do not do this for income statement figures since end-of-year numbers are the figures we need.
Risk complicates the analysis of a bank’s production technology. The assumption of cost minimization may be inappropriate without accounting for risk because cost is affected by the degree of risk a bank takes. We accommodate risk indirectly by including some control variables like equity capital, nonperforming loans, and off-balance sheet activities. This is the standard approach in the literature. A more desirable approach would be to account for endogenous risk taking as in Hughes and Mester (2013) and Malikov et al. (2014). However, doing so will highly complicate our nonparametric estimation strategy. The results in Hughes and Mester (2013) and Malikov et al. (2014) suggest that the estimates of RTS are biased downwards when risk taking is not taken into account. Thus, our results can be viewed as the lower bounds of economies of scale.
We treat physical capital as a variable input and compute its price for each year as the ratio between expenses of premises and fixed assets over the quarterly average of total premises and fixed assets. Ideally, one should use the opportunity cost of such assets for this computation. We believe, however, that since expenses of premises and fixed assets include all non-interest expenses related to the use of premises and fixed assets, including capitalized leases, net of their rental income, our approach may reasonably resemble the opportunity cost of using such assets.
The \(R^2\) values for these models are 0.978 and 0.916, respectively.The fit of the PL model \((R^2)\) is not comparable to the other two models because the dependent variables are not the same. The \(R^2\) of the PL model is 0.847.
We use 99 bootstrap replications which gave a p-value of almost zero.
Such an exercise is beyond the scope of the present paper. We leave this for future research.
The positive relationship between the growth in variable cost and equity capital suggests that to produce a given output vector with more equity capital banks also spend more on variable inputs. Apart from possible agency problems, two potential and important explanations could be that to do so banks spend more on either reducing or taking on more risk. If nonperforming loans are a valid proxy for realized credit risk, the positive relationship between variable cost and nonperforming loans seems to be consistent with the latter explanation. This discussion is not central to our paper and since it deserves a deeper analysis we left it for future research.
We classify banks by total assets as follows: Big (assets \(>\) $1 billion), medium ($100 million \(<\) assets \(<\) $1 billion), and small (assets \(<\) $100 million) banks. The top 100 banks correspond to the 100 biggest banks by assets each year. This classification is typically used in the literature (see Feng and Serletis 2009).
RTS estimates from the SPG model has more extreme values than those from the PG model. This is expected from a nonparametric model. That is, the distribution of RTS from the PG model is quite tight.
See Kumbhakar and Sun (2012) for a discussion on this issue based on an input distance function formulation.
This finding is not new in the TFP growth literature. For example, see Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005) and the references cited in there.
One of the anonymous referees indicated that these results could be of independent interest. We leave a throughout analysis of them for future research.
We thank two anonymous referees for this suggestion.
Wheelock and Wilson (2012) do not report specific measures of scale economies. However, from their discussion on page 192 we could back up the value of 1.25 for the biggest 20 BHCs. They explain that by reducing the size of a BHC like Citibank by a factor of 0.5012 leads to a decrease in costs by a factor \(1-0.5952\). This is equivalent to a decrease of \(0.4008=0.5012 \times 1/1.2504=1-0.5952\). Equivalently, increasing the size of Citibank by 1 %, would increase its costs by only 0.7997 % (\(1\,\% \times 1/1.2504\)). Given that the size of Citibank in 2006 (measured by assets) was $1.885 trillion dollars, a 1 % increase in total assets ($18.85 billion) would lead to an increase in total costs by $15.07 billion \((\$18.85 \times 1/1.2504)\) which implies scale economies of $3.77 billion.
The banks belonging to the top one hundred banks have assets ranging from $23 million to $1.5 million.
Including the years 2007 and 2008, only 57 % of the observations for the top ten biggest banks are consistent with increasing RTS. Among the top ten biggest banks for each year are State Street Bank and Trust Company, CitiBank, US Bank, Wachovia, HSBC, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Fleet National Bank, Suntrust Bank, Keybank, PNC Bank, Regions Bank, JP Morgan Chase, and Citizens Bank.
Explicitly, the kernel function is written as:
$$\begin{aligned} {\mathcal {K}}(\cdot ) = \prod _{l=1}^{K+Q+P} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \pi }} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{{\mathcal {Z}}_{lit}-z_l}{h_l}\right) ^2\right) \end{aligned}$$We use the functions npscoefbw and npscoef with their default values. To decrease the estimation computational time, we set the optimization options to “nmulti \(=\) 1”, “optim.abstol \(=\) 0.000001”, and “optim.reltol \(=\) sqrt(0.000001)”.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the Editor and two anonymous referees for their helpful and insightful comments. However, the authors are solely responsible for the views expressed in this article. Restrepo-Tobón acknowledges financial support from the Colombian Fulbright Commission; the Colombian Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation (Colciencias); and EAFIT University.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: TFP growth decomposition
Starting with the standard definition of TFP change in Eq. (7) and adding \(\dot{TFP}\) to both sides of Eq. (5) we have:
Using the definitions \(\dot{\widetilde{C}}=\dot{C} - \dot{W}_K\) and \(\dot{C}= \sum _{k=1}^K S_k \dot{W}_k + \sum _{k=1}^K S_k \dot{X}_k\),the right-hand-side of Eq. (10) can be expressed as:
Since \(\sum _{k=1}^K S_k = 1\), \(\dot{W}_k = \dot{\widetilde{W}_k} +\dot{W}_K\), \(\forall k=1,\ldots ,K-1\), and \(\dot{\widetilde{W}_K} = 0\),
Using this result, the relationship in Eq. (10) can be expressed as:
Appendix 2: Model specifications and estimation
Following Li et al. (2002) and Li and Racine (2007), the local-constant estimator for \(\varPsi (z)\) in Eq. (9) is expressed as:
where \(N\) and \(T\) denotes number of banks and time periods, respectively, \(h\) is a \((K+Q+P)\) vector with each element a selected bandwidth for each \(z\) variable and \({\mathcal {K}}(\cdot )\) is the product Gaussian kernel function.Footnote 34
Note that if the kernel function is absent, then the SPSC estimator reduces to its OLS counterpart. The SPSC model also nests the partially linear model proposed by Robinson (1988) as a special case, which makes only the intercept an unknown smooth function of the \({\mathcal {Z}}\) variables.
Following Li and Racine (2010), we employ the most commonly used least-squares cross-validation (LSCV) method, which is a fully automatic data-driven approach, to select the bandwidth vector \(h\), i.e.,
where \(CV_{lc}(h)\) determines the cross-validation bandwidth vector \(h\) for local constant estimator, \({\mathcal {X}}'_{it}\hat{\varPsi }_{-it}({\mathcal {Z}}_{it}) \) is the leave-one-out local-constant kernel conditional mean, and \(0 \le M(\cdot ) \le 1\) is a weight function that serves to avoid difficulties caused by dividing by zero. Unlike other methods proposed in the recent literature (e.g. Feng and Serletis 2010 and Wheelock and Wilson 2011) the SPG model can be easily estimated using widely available statistical software. For instance, the bandwidths for the \({\mathcal {Z}}\) variables and the smooth coefficients can be estimated using the \(NP\) package in R (Hayfield and Racine 2008).Footnote 35
Now, assuming that \(f(\cdot )\) in Eq. (3) is translog, the estimating equation for the PL model is:
After estimating Eq. (16), the functional coefficients for the PL model are computed using:
Plugging Eq. (17)–(20) into Eq. (5) gives:
Rearranging Eq. (21) gives the estimating equation for the PG model as follows:
After estimating Eq. (22), we compute the functional coefficients for the PG model using Eqs. (17)–(20).
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Restrepo-Tobón, D., Kumbhakar, S.C. & Sun, K. Obelix vs. Asterix: Size of US commercial banks and its regulatory challenge. J Regul Econ 48, 125–168 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-015-9275-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-015-9275-1