Designing optimal gain sharing plans to promote energy conservation
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We analyze the optimal design of gain sharing plans to promote energy conservation. We show how the optimal plan varies as industry conditions and the regulator’s information change. We demonstrate the importance of allowing the energy supplier a choice among plans, some of which offer the prospect of both pronounced financial gains for superior performance and substantial losses for inferior performance.
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- Designing optimal gain sharing plans to promote energy conservation
Journal of Regulatory Economics
Volume 42, Issue 2 , pp 115-134
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer US
- Additional Links
- Energy conservation
- Gain sharing
- Asymmetric information
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Information and Operations Management, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 90089, CA, USA
- 2. Department of Economics, Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, 32611, FL, USA