Date: 27 Feb 2007
Optimal Timing of Real Estate Investment under an Asymmetric Duopoly
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This paper examines the sub-game equilibrium strategies for a duopoly real option model consisting of two firms with asymmetric demand functions. The relative strength of the firms is found to have significant impact on the firms’ equilibrium strategies. Preemptive strategies are critical if difference in strength between the two competing firms is relatively small. Short bursts and recession induced overbuilding are two outcomes in the asymmetric duopoly model. The model, however, predicts that the two phenomena occur in earlier phases of market cycles, rather than in the state of depression. In a depressed market with high volatility, the leader and the follower will both choose the waiting strategies. Construction cascade is, therefore, not an expected phenomenon in a depressed market in the asymmetric duopoly framework.
Please forward your comments to the second author at firstname.lastname@example.org. Your comments are appreciated. The authors wish to thank Stephen Cauley, Walter Torous, an anonymous referee, and participants in the Singapore–Hong Kong Real Estate Research Symposium on 14–15 July 2005 for their constructive comments and suggestions.
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- Optimal Timing of Real Estate Investment under an Asymmetric Duopoly
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
Volume 34, Issue 3 , pp 327-345
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- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers
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- Duopoly game
- Real options
- Preemptive strategies
- Asymmetric demands
- Industry Sectors