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The effects of detailing on prescribing decisions under quality uncertainty

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Abstract

Motivated by recent empirical findings on the relationship between new clinical evidence and the effectiveness of detailing, this paper develops a new structural model of detailing and prescribing decisions under the environment where both manufacturers and physicians are uncertain about drug qualities. Our model assumes (1) a representative opinion leader is responsible for updating the prior belief about the quality of drugs via consumption experiences and clinical trial outcomes, and (2) manufacturers use detailing as a means to build/maintain the measure of physicians who are informed of the current information sets. Unlike previous learning models with informative detailing, our model directly links the effectiveness of detailing to the current information sets and the measures of well-informed physicians. To illustrate the empirical implications of the new model, we estimate our model using a product level panel data on sales volume, prices, detailing minutes, and clinical trial outcomes for ACE-inhibitors with diuretics in Canada. Using our estimates, we demonstrate how the effectiveness of detailing depends on the information sets and the measures of well-informed physicians. Furthermore, we conduct a policy experiment to examine how a public awareness campaign, which encourages physicians/patients to report their drug experiences, would affect managerial incentives to detail. The results demonstrate that the empirical and managerial implications of our model can be very different from those of previous models. We argue that our results point out the importance of developing a structural model that captures the mechanism of how detailing/advertising conveys information in the market under study.

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Notes

  1. We provide a formal definition of forgetting in our context in Section 3.2.

  2. For example, the number of active drugs in the cardiovascular drug category increased from 215 in March 1993 to 294 in February 1999 in Canada.

  3. In a survey conducted by Salisbury et al. (1998), they found that more than 70% of general practitioners (GPs) agreed that there was too much information available on prescribing changes to assimilate, and they did not have enough time to keep themselves updated of recent recommendations in drug usage. Interestingly, when the GPs were asked which sources of advice about prescribing they found most useful, they ranked medical advisors (correspond to opinion leaders) and sales representatives the highest.

  4. Obviously, drug qualities are multi-dimensional. Following Ching (2000), we assume patients are able to use a scoring rule to map all measurable qualities to a one-dimensional index. It is the value of this one-dimensional index that enters the utility function.

  5. However, with individual level data, it is feasible to estimate a model of learning with partial forgetting (Mehta et al. 2004).

  6. We thank an anonymous referee who suggests to us to explore this prediction.

  7. This is equivalent to modeling physicians’ choice as a two-stage nested process, where they choose between the inside goods and the outside good in the first stage, and then choose an alternative among the inside goods in the second stage.

  8. Anand and Shachar (2005) introduced a framework of informative advertising, which could also lead to marginal return of detailing either increasing or decreasing over time when combined with persuasive effects. The logic is that consumers are uncertain about whether they match well with some unobserved product attributes. Suppose that the consumers do not match well with the product. The marginal return due to informative advertising would then be negative, and diminishing over time. Now suppose that the marginal return due to persuasive advertising is constant over time. Then the total marginal return (informative + persuasive) would be increasing over time and converges to the marginal return due to persuasive advertising alone.

  9. Alternatively, to capture the intuitive relationship that we discuss here, one could allow a detailing goodwill stock interacting with the expect quality to enter the utility function. Such a modification can be viewed as a reduced form of our structural model.

  10. But even before we reach the long run, the fluctuation of market shares and detailing efforts (current and past) would also help identify (β 0, β 1, φ G ), as we point out in the previous subsection about the relationship between \(\frac{\partial S_{jt}}{\partial D_{jt}}\) and (\(\frac{\partial M_{jt}}{\partial D_{jt}}, M_{kt}\)).

  11. We believe that the latter case is very unlikely. To our knowledge, most of the existing studies find positive correlation between detailing and demand. Moreover, it is likely that opinion leaders or informed physicians are more familiar with the clinical studies that allow the manufacturer to gain the approval of selling a new drug.

  12. PubMed (www.pubmed.gov) is a service of the U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM) that includes over 18 million citations from MEDLINE, the NLM’s premier bibliographic database for the life sciences, and other life science journals for biomedical articles back to 1948.

  13. This set of drugs includes Alpha blockers, Antiarrhythmic agents, Anticoagulants, Antiplatelets, Thrombolytics, Beta blockers, Calcium channel blockers, Centrally acting drugs, Cholesterol-lowering agents, Digitalis drugs, Direct Vasodilators, Nitrates, Peripheral adrenergic antagonists, AII Receptor Antagonists, and other combination drugs. In our estimation, we treat ACE-inhibitor and Thiazide Diuretic as explicit substitutes for ACE-inhibitor with diuretics and use the total sales of these three sub-categories of drugs to construct the potential market size for ACE-inhibitor with diuretics.

  14. Due to the space constraint, we did not plot how \(\sigma_j^2(t)\) changes over time. It is available upon request.

  15. Although the effect of a one-time increase in detailing might seem small, the impact in terms of elasticity is in line with estimates from some previous studies. For example, Berndt et al. (1997) estimated the upper bound of the elasticity of demand w.r.t. cumulative detailing minutes to be 0.67. We find that the point estimates of the elasticity range from 0.10 to 0.27 here (they differ across time). Moreover, it should be noted that a one-time increase in detailing will also have long-term impacts on demand, which we did not show here.

  16. The main objective of this policy experiment is to illustrate the empirical implications of our model. In order to quantify the impact of this policy accurately, one needs to calibrate the baseline value of κ, which requires additional data on the rate at which patients report their experiences to the public domain.

  17. It should be noted that since we do not allow for the bribery effect of detailing in our model, we may overestimate the importance of informative effect.

  18. Ching and Ishihara (2009) have recently proposed a new identification strategy to measure these two effects separately. Their idea is to focus on markets where two firms sign a co-marketing agreement to market the same chemical using two different brand-names.

  19. To simplify notations, we drop the o superscript for \(\underline{q}_j\) and \(\underline{\sigma}_j^2\).

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Acknowledgements

We thank Dan Ackerberg, Pradeep Chintagunta, Avi Goldfarb, Tom Holmes, Ig Horstmann, Ahmed Khwaja, Nitin Mehta, Sridhar Moorthy, Mengze Shi, Wei Tan, various conferences and seminars participants, and in particular two anonymous referees, and the editor, Peter Rossi, for their helpful comments. We also thank Matt Shum for helping us obtain the data from IMS Canada. The usual disclaimer applies. Ching’s work on this project is supported by Connaught New-staff matching grant at the University of Toronto.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Identification

1.1 A.1 Learning parameters

In this appendix, we show how learning parameters are identified in our model. Given our functional form assumption on the utility function, the subutility associated with the expected quality and perceived variance for informed physicians is written as

$$ - \exp(-r E[q_j|I(t)] + \frac{1}{2}r^2(\sigma_j^2(t)+\sigma_\delta^2)). $$

At time t, the expected quality and perceived variance given the past consumption and clinical trial signals are expressed as

$$\begin{array}{lll} E[q_j|I(t)] &=& \frac{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 \underline{q}_j + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2\sum_{s=1}^{N_{jt-1}} \mu_{js}^e + \underline{\sigma}_j^2 \sigma_\delta^2 \sum_{s=1}^{N_{jt-1}^c} \mu_{js}^c} {\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c}\\ \sigma_j^2(t) &=& \frac{\underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2}{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c}, \end{array}$$

where \(\sigma_\delta^2\) is the signal variance for consumption signals, \(\sigma_\eta^2\) is the signal variance for clinical trial signals, \(\underline{q}_j\) is the initial mean quality for drug j, \(\underline{\sigma}_j^2\) is the initial perceived variance for drug j,Footnote 19 N jt is the cumulative number of consumption signals for drug j at time t, \(N_{jt}^c\) is the cumulative number of clinical trial signals for drug j at time t, and \(\mu_{js}^e\) and \(\mu_{js}^c\) are the sth consumption and clinical trial signals for drug j, respectively. Note that \(\mu_{js}^e=q_j+\sigma_\delta\delta_{js}\) and \(\mu_{js}^c = q_j+\sigma_\eta\eta_{js}\) where q j is the true mean quality for drug j, and δ js and η js are signal noises. Thus, for the subutility function, the terms inside the exponential function above can be rewritten as

$$\begin{array}{lll} \lefteqn{r E[q_j|I(t)] - \frac{1}{2}r^2(\sigma_j^2(t)+\sigma_\delta^2) }\\ &=& \frac{r(\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 \underline{q}_j + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2\sum_{s=1}^{N_{jt-1}} (q_j+\sigma_\delta\delta_{js}) + \underline{\sigma}_j^2 \sigma_\delta^2 \sum_{s=1}^{N_{jt-1}^c} (q_j+\sigma_\eta\eta_{js}))}{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c}\\ &&-\frac{\frac{1}{2}r^2(\underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2+\sigma_\delta^2(\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c))}{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c}\\ &=& \frac{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2(r\underline{q}_j - \frac{1}{2}r^2(\underline{\sigma}_j^2+\sigma_\delta^2))}{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 +\sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c} + \frac{\sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2(rq_j-\frac{1}{2}r^2\sigma_\delta^2)}{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c}N_{jt-1}\\ &&+ \frac{\underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2(rq_j-\frac{1}{2}r^2\sigma_\delta^2)}{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c}N_{jt-1}^c \\&&+ \frac{r\underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta\sigma_\eta \left(\sigma_\eta\sum_{s=1}^{N_{jt-1}}\delta_{js}+\sigma_\delta\sum_{s=1}^{N_{jt-1}^c}\eta_{js}\right)}{\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2 N_{jt-1} + \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2 N_{jt-1}^c} \end{array}$$

The nonlinear expression above implies that the variations in N jt and \(N_{jt}^c\) across periods identify \(\underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2\), \(\sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2\), \(\sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2\), and the following three parts:

$$ \sigma_\delta^2\sigma_\eta^2(r\underline{q}_j - \frac{1}{2}r^2(\underline{\sigma}_j^2+\sigma_\delta^2)), \;\;\;\; \sigma_\eta^2\underline{\sigma}_j^2(rq_j-\frac{1}{2}r^2\sigma_\delta^2), \;\;\;\; \underline{\sigma}_j^2\sigma_\delta^2(rq_j-\frac{1}{2}r^2\sigma_\delta^2). $$

We can thus pin down \(\underline{\sigma}_j^2\), \(\sigma_\delta^2\), and \(\sigma_\eta^2\). It is clear that we cannot separately identify r, \(\underline{q}_j\), and q j . In our application, we normalize q 1 = 1. This allows us to pin down r and \(\underline{q}_j\). Note that since r is common across drugs, we only need to fix the true mean quality for one of the drugs.

Coscelli and Shum (2004) argue that under their functional form assumption on the utility function, \(\underline{\sigma}_j\) and r cannot be separately identified. Thus, they consider two alternative normalizations: (1) assume consumers are risk neutral, (2) assume the initial prior mean quality is equal to the true mean quality for all drugs (rational expectation assumption). Our identification requirements are slightly different from Coscelli and Shum (2004) because they assume utility is linear in the expected quality and perceived variance whereas we assume a CARA specification.

1.2 A.2 β 0, β 1 and φ G

It is worth discussing the identification of β 1 and φ G (the parameters that determine M). It may first appear that it is hard to separately identify them, because intuitively the effect on M due to an increase in β 1 (which captures the role of building up M) could be canceled by increasing φ G (which captures the depreciation rate of M) appropriately. However, a more careful examination of Eqs. (7) and (8) reveals that there are subtle differences in terms of how M is generated by β 1 and φ G . Notice that for each M jt , there is a unique (β 0 + β 1 G jt ) which can be written as

$$ \beta_0 + \beta_1\left(\sum\limits_{\tau=1}^{t-1}(1-\phi_G)^{t-\tau}D_{j\tau}\right) + \beta_1D_{jt}. $$

It should be clear that the variation in D jt across time and drugs would be sufficient to identify β 0, β 1 and φ G . Intuitively, as long as we have more than three observations, there will be overidentifying restrictions that allow us to estimate these three parameters.

Appendix B: Incorporating the outcome of clinical trials in Bayesian updating

In this appendix, we show how to draw a quality signal from a direct comparison clinical trial. Each clinical trial tells us: (1) which drug does better in the trial, (2) the number of participants who take each drug (i.e., \(n_j^c\), for j = 1,2). How do we simulate a draw of \(\bar{q}^c_j\), for j = 1,2? Let’s first define \(\Delta \bar{q}^c\equiv \bar{q}^c_1-\bar{q}^c_2\). Given the distribution of \(\bar{q}^c_j\), \(\Delta \bar{q}\sim N\left(q_1-q_2,\sigma_\eta^2\left(\frac{1}{n_1^c}+\frac{1}{n_2^c}\right)\right)\). The outcome of clinical trials belongs to one of the three cases: (1) \(\Delta \bar{q}^{c>0}\), (2) \(\Delta \bar{q}^{c<0}\), and (3) \(\Delta \bar{q}^{c=0}\). In case (1), we make a draw for \(\Delta \bar{q}^{c*}\) from \(N\left(q_1-q_2,\sigma_\eta^2\left(\frac{1}{n_1^c}+\frac{1}{n_2^c}\right)\right)\) truncated below at zero. Case (2) is similar. In case (3), we simply set \(\Delta \bar{q}^{c*} = 0\). Then, we make a draw for drug 1, \(\bar{q}_1^{c*}\), from \(N(q_1,\frac{\sigma_\eta^2}{n_1^c})\), and set \(\bar{q}_2^{c*}\) by \(\bar{q}_2^{c*} = \bar{q}_1^{c*} - \Delta \bar{q}^{c*}\). With these simulated draws, we can update prior using the Bayesian updating rule.

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Ching, A., Ishihara, M. The effects of detailing on prescribing decisions under quality uncertainty. Quant Mark Econ 8, 123–165 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-010-9082-z

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