, Volume 157, Issue 3-4, pp 449-474
Date: 21 Nov 2013

Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital

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Introduction

Recent decades have witnessed an explosion in the interest in the factors potentially determining economic growth (cf. Barro 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). This is not least the case for studies of the potential growth-inducing effects of political institutions.

See, e.g., North and Thomas (1973), Weaver and Rockman (1993b), Kasper and Streit (1998), Borner and Paldam (1998), Scully (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik et al. (2004), and de Haan (2007).

However, while the protection of property rights often is found to be important for economic growth, many other results from the empirical research on the institutional determinants of economic growth seem either ambivalent or contradictory. Most notably, researchers have so far failed to reach anything remotely resembling consensus on the effects of democracy on economic growth, with studies finding both positive and negative relationships, non-linear relationships and no effects at all, or, for that matter, that caus

An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0177-z.