Public Choice

, Volume 157, Issue 1, pp 57–71

The political economy of the Reconstruction Era’s race riots

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9955-7

Cite this article as:
Carden, A. & Coyne, C.J. Public Choice (2013) 157: 57. doi:10.1007/s11127-012-9955-7

Abstract

This paper analyzes the political economy of the Reconstruction Era’s (1865–1877) race riots through the economic logic of rules. The central argument is that the race riots were not an inevitable outcome at the end of the Civil War, but instead occurred because of the absence of effective rules to raise the cost of engaging in violence. We offer a general framework of ‘rule stickiness’ to analyze the process of rule reform. This framework offers insight into the conditions influencing the enforcement costs of formal rules, as well as the likelihood of third-party enforcers effectively monitoring and punishing rule breakers. The Memphis race riot of 1866 is provided as a case study to illuminate the explanatory power of the theoretical framework.

Keywords

Reconstruction Era Race riots Rule reform Rule stickiness Memphis riot of 1866 

JEL Classification

D74 B52 N41 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Finance and Quantitative Analysis Organization: Brock School of BusinessSamford UniversityBirminghamUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA