Voters, dictators, and peons: expressive voting and pivotality
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Why do the poor vote against redistribution? We examine one explanation experimentally, namely that individuals gain direct expressive utility from voting in accordance with their ideology and understand that they are unlikely to be pivotal; hence, their expressive utility, even if arbitrarily small, determines their voting behavior. In contrast with a basic prediction of this model, we find that the probability of being pivotal does not affect the impact of monetary interest on whether a subject votes for redistribution.
- Benabou, R., Ok, E. A. (2001) Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the POUM hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: pp. 447-487 CrossRef
- Blais, A., Young, R., Lapp, M. (2000) The calculus of voting: an empirical test. European Journal of Political Research 37: pp. 181-201
- Brennan, G., Buchanan, J. (1984) Voter choice: evaluating political alternatives. American Behavioral Scientist 28: pp. 185-201 CrossRef
- Brennan, G., Hamlin, A. (1988) Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice 95: pp. 149-175 CrossRef
- Brennan, G., Lomasky, L. (1993) Democracy and decision: the pure theory of electoral preference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge CrossRef
- Carter, J. R., Guerette, S. D. (1992) An experimental study of expressive voting. Public Choice 73: pp. 251-260 CrossRef
- Copeland, C., Laband, D. N. (2002) Expressiveness and voting. Public Choice 110: pp. 351-363 CrossRef
- Cummings, R. G., Elliott, S., Harrison, G. W., Murphy, J. (1997) Are hypothetical referenda incentive compatible?. Journal of Political Economy 105: pp. 609-621 CrossRef
- Dittmann, I., Kubler, D., Maug, E., & Mechtenberg, L. (2009). Why votes have a value. Working Paper.
- Duffy, J., Tavits, M. (2008) Beliefs and voting decisions: a test of the pivotal voter model. American Journal of Political Science 52: pp. 603-618 CrossRef
- Durante, R., & Putterman, L. (2009). Preferences for redistribution and perception of fairness: an experimental study. SSRN Working Paper 1004573.
- Edlin, A. S., Gelman, A., Kaplan, N. (2007) Voting as a rational choice: why and how people vote to improve the well-being of others. Rationality and Society 19: pp. 293-314 CrossRef
- Farber, H. S. (2009). Rational choice and voter turnout: evidence from union representation elections. Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper 552.
- Feddersen, T., Gailmard, S., Sandroni, A. (2009) Moral bias in large elections: theory and experimental evidence. American Political Science Review 103: pp. 175-192 CrossRef
- Fischer, A. J. (1996) A further experimental study of expressive voting. Public Choice 88: pp. 171-184 CrossRef
- Fong, C. (2001) Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. Journal of Public Economics 82: pp. 225-246 CrossRef
- Gelman, A., Silver, N., & Edlin A. S. (forthcoming). What is the probability your vote will make a difference. Economic Inquiry.
- Haab, T. C., Huang, J.-C., Whitehead, J. C. (1999) Are hypothetical referenda incentive compatible? A comment. Journal of Political Economy 107: pp. 186-196 CrossRef
- Houser, D., Stratmann, T. (2008) Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform. Public Choice 136: pp. 215-239 CrossRef
- Houser, D., Morton, R., Stratmann, T. (2011) Turned on or turned out? Campaign advertising, information and voting. European Journal of Political Economy 27: pp. 708-727 CrossRef
- Krupnikov, Y., Levine, A. S., Lupia, A., Prior, M. (2006) Public ignorance and estate tax repeal: the effect of partisan differences and survey incentives. National Tax Journal 59: pp. 425-437
- Laband, D. N., Pandit, R., Laband, A. M., Sophocleus, J. P. (2008) Pigskins and politics: linking expressive behavior and voting. Journal of Sports Economics 9: pp. 553-560 CrossRef
- Levine, D. K., Palfrey, T. R. (2007) The paradox of voter participation? A laboratory study. American Political Science Review 101: pp. 143-158 CrossRef
- Mueller, D. C. (1989) Public choice II: a revised edition of public choice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Putterman, L. Property relations, incentives, and welfare. In: Roemer, J. E. eds. (1997) Why have the rabble not redistributed the wealth? On the stability of democracy and unequal property. Macmillan, London, pp. 359-389
- Roemer, J. E. (1998) Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb. Journal of Public Economics 70: pp. 399-424 CrossRef
- Shayo, M., & Harel, A. (2010). Non-consequentialist voting. Working Paper.
- Sobel, R. S., Wagner, G. A. (2004) Expressive voting and government redistribution: testing Tullock’s ‘Charity of the uncharitable’. Public Choice 119: pp. 143-159 CrossRef
- Tullock, G. (1971) The charity of the uncharitable. Western Economic Journal 9: pp. 379-392
- Tyran, J.-R. (2004) Voting when money and morals conflict: an experimental test of expressive voting. Journal of Public Economics 88: pp. 1645-1664 CrossRef
- Voters, dictators, and peons: expressive voting and pivotality
Volume 159, Issue 1-2 , pp 159-176
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer US
- Additional Links
- Expressive voting
- Industry Sectors