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Tullock on motivated inquiry: expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk

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Abstract

Gordon Tullock denied scientific status to economics because economists can trade results with the subject of our analysis. We suppose this trading to be the fate of all disciplines in which the results have consequences for well-being of those studied. Non-transparent trading in a statistical context gives no reason to believe that the sampling distribution of the estimates will be what it is believed to be. This false belief turns risk to uncertainty. Taking trading between experts and subjects as inevitable, we ask if the trade is fair. When scientific unanimity fails, can Rawlsian unanimity replace it?

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 22030, USA

    David M. Levy

  2. Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, 23173, USA

    Sandra J. Peart

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  1. David M. Levy
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  2. Sandra J. Peart
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Correspondence to David M. Levy.

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Levy, D.M., Peart, S.J. Tullock on motivated inquiry: expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk. Public Choice 152, 163–180 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9858-z

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