Public Choice

, Volume 154, Issue 1, pp 39–58

Charitable giving in the German welfare state: fiscal incentives and crowding out

Authors

  • Timm Bönke
    • Institute for Public Finance and Social PolicyFreie Universitaet Berlin
  • Nima Massarrat-Mashhadi
    • Department of Finance, Accounting and TaxationFreie Universitaet Berlin
    • Department of Finance, Accounting and TaxationFreie Universitaet Berlin
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9806-y

Cite this article as:
Bönke, T., Massarrat-Mashhadi, N. & Sielaff, C. Public Choice (2013) 154: 39. doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9806-y

Abstract

There are two ways that government activities influence private charitable giving: (1) government spending on the provision of public goods may cause crowding out of private charitable contributions; and (2) tax incentives may boost private charitable giving. From a sample of German income tax returns, we estimate the elasticity of charitable giving relative to tax incentives, income, and government spending. Using censored quantile regression analysis, we derive results for different points of the underlying distribution of charitable giving. Evaluating overall treasury efficiency, the tax deductibility of charitable donations fosters enough private giving to offset foregone tax revenues.

Keywords

Charitable givingCrowding outPrice and income elasticityCensored quantile regressionIncome tax return data

JEL Classification

C31H31H53
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011