Abstract
Using ADA roll call voting scores for the 1947–2006 period, I find that senators shirk in their last term. The degree of shirking is limited by political parties, which constrain the politician in his last term, and varies by post-Senate career choices. The results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics.
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DeBacker, J. Political parties and political shirking. Public Choice 150, 651–670 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9722-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9722-6