Public Choice

, Volume 150, Issue 3, pp 439–467

Uncertainty and ratification failure

Authors

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9710-x

Cite this article as:
Kıbrıs, A. Public Choice (2012) 150: 439. doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9710-x
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Abstract

I study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo. For their agreement to come into effect, they need the approval of a third agent. The preferences of this third agent is private information, but there is communication among agents. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an explanation for involuntary ratification failures. I show that under certain assumptions, the informational deficiency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences, and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the executive to be risk averse.

Keywords

Game theoryBargainingSignaling gamesLinkage politicsInternational cooperationIncomplete information

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010