Abstract
In a parsimonious model of a collective decision problem with partially conflicting interests, we show that restricting communication may enhance decision quality. If disclosed information is observed by decision makers with different preferences, individuals may strategically withhold information. In this case, a committee member’s silence arouses the other members’ suspicions. As a consequence, in case of residual uncertainty, individual votes may react less to information that is publicly observed.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Austen-Smith, D. (1990a). Information transmission in debate. American Journal of Political Science, 34, 124–152.
Austen-Smith, D. (1990b). Credible debate equilibria. Social Choice and Welfare, 7, 75–93.
Austen-Smith, D., & Feddersen, F. (2006). Deliberation, preference uncertainty, and voting rules. American Political Science Review, 100(2), 209–217.
Caillaud, B., & Tirole, J. (2007). Consensus building: how to persuade a group. American Economic Review, 97, 1877–1900.
Coughlan, P. (2000). In defence of unanimous jury verdicts: communication, mistrials, and sincerity. American Political Science Review, 94, 375–393.
Crawford, V., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50, 1431–1451.
Dewatripont, M., & Tirole, J. (1999). Advocates. Journal of Political Economy, 107, 1–39.
Doraszelski, U., Gerardi, D., & Squintani, F. (2003). Communication and voting with double-sided information. Contributions to Theoretical Economics, 3(1), 6.
Dur, R., & Swank, O. (2005). Producing and manipulating information. Economic Journal, 115, 185–199.
Farrell, J., & Gibbons, R. (1989). Cheap talk with two audiences. American Economic Review, 79, 1214–1223.
Gerardi, D., Mc Lean, R., & Postlewaite, A. (2009). Aggregation of expert opinions. Games and Economic Behavior, 65, 339–371.
Gerling, K., Grüner, H. P., Kiel, A., & Schulte, E. (2005). Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey. European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 563–597.
Giovannoni, F., & Seidmann, D. (2007). Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 296–315.
Hummel, P. (2009). Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences. Mimeo.
Le Quement, M. (2009). Subgroup deliberation and voting. Mimeo.
Maug, E., & Yilmaz, B. (2002). Two-class voting: a mechanism for conflict resolution. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1448–1471.
Meirowitz, A. (2007). Designing institutions to aggregate preferences and information. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1, 373–392.
Milgrom, P. (1981). Good news and bad news: representation theorems and applications. Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 380–391.
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986). Relying on the information of interested parties. The RAND Journal of Economics, 17(1), 18–32.
Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Postlewaite, A., & Suzumura, K. (1990). Strategic information revelation. Review of Economic Studies, 57, 25–47.
Ottaviani, M., & Sorensen, P. (2001). Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first. Journal of Public Economics, 81, 393–421.
Piketty, T. (1999). The information aggregation approach to political institutions. European Economic Review, 43, 791–800.
Schulte, E. (2010). Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees. Theory and Decision, 69, 97–118.
Seidmann, D., & Winter, E. (1997). Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages. Econometrica, 65, 163–169.
Wolinsky, A. (2002). Eliciting information from multiple experts. Games and Economic Behavior, 41(1), 141–160.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Schulte, E. Communication in committees: who should listen?. Public Choice 150, 97–117 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9691-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9691-9