Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic analysis of corruption: a survey. Economic Journal
Arikan, G. G. (2004). Fiscal decentralization: a remedy for corruption? International Tax and Public Finance
Arzaghi, M., & Henderson, J. V. (2005). Why countries are fiscally decentralizing. Journal of Public Economics
Banerjee, A. V. (1997). A theory of misgovernance. Quarterly Journal of Economics
Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2006). Decentralization, corruption and government accountability. In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International handbook on the economics of corruption (pp. 161–188). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Basu, K., Bhattacharya, S., & Mishra, A. (1992). Notes on bribery and the control of corruption. Journal of Public Economics
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy
Becker, G. S., & Stigler, G. J. (1974). Law enforcement, malfeasance and the compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies
Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The power to tax. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brueckner, J. (2000). Fiscal decentralization in developing countries: the effects of local corruption and tax evasion. Annals of Economics and Finance, 1, 1–18.
Carr, J. B., & Feiock, R. C. (Eds.) (2004). City-county consolidation and its alternatives: reshaping the local government landscape. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Corporate Crime Reporter (2004). Public corruption in the United States
. January 16, 2004. Available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/corruptreport.pdf
Fisher, R. C., & Wassmer, R. W. (1998). Economic influences on the structure of local government in U.S. metropolitan areas. Journal of Urban Economics
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002a). Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries. Journal of Public Economics
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002b). Decentralization and corruption: evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs. Public Choice
Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006). Corruption in America. Journal of Public Economics
Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M. A. (1998). Corruption and government size: a disaggregated analysis. Public Choice
Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M. A. (2007). Are corrupt acts contagious? Evidence from the United States. Journal of Policy Modeling
Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M. A. (2010). Causes of corruption: history, geography and government. Journal of Policy Modeling (forthcoming).
Goel, R. K., & Rich, D. P. (1989). On the economic incentives for taking bribes. Public Choice
Guriev, S. (2004). Red tape and corruption. Journal of Development Economics
Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: a review. Journal of Economic Surveys
Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2006). Causes and consequences of corruption: what do we know from a cross-section of countries? In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International handbook on the economics of corruption (pp. 3–51). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Lambsdorff, J. G., & Teksoz, S. U. (2004). Corrupt relational contracting. In J. G. Lambsdorff, M. Schramm, & M. Taube (Eds.), The new institutional economics of corruption (pp. 138–151). New York: Rutledge.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Judicial checks and balances. Journal of Political Economy
Meier, K. J., & Holbrook, T. M. (1992). “I Seen my Opportunities and I took ’em:” political corruption in the American states. Journal of Politics
Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. (1995). Corruptible law enforcers: how should they be compensated? Economic Journal
Murphy, R. L., Libonatti, O., & Salinardi, M. (1995). Overview and comparison of fiscal decentralization experiences. In R. L. Murphy (Ed.), Fiscal decentralization in Latin America (pp. 1–57). Washington: Inter-American Development Bank.
Nelson, M. A. (1990). Decentralization of the subnational public sector: an empirical analysis of the determinants of local government structure in metropolitan areas in the US. Southern Economic Journal
Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature
Paldam, M. (2002). The cross-country pattern of corruption: economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics. European Journal of Political Economy
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2000). Political economics—explaining public policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Priks, M. (2007). Judiciaries in corrupt societies. CESifo working paper #2008.
Prud’homme, R. (1995). The dangers of decentralization. The World Bank Research Observer 10.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: a study in political economy. New York: Academic Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosen, H. S. (1995). Public finance. Chicago: Irwin.
Serra, D. (2006). Empirical determinants of corruption: a sensitivity analysis. Public Choice
Shah, A. (2006). Corruption and decentralized public governance. World Bank Policy Research working paper #3824, January.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1999). The grabbing hand. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives
Tanzi, V. (1994). Corruption, governmental activities, and markets. IMF Working Paper.
Tanzi, V. (1996). Fiscal federalism and decentralization: a review of some efficiency and macroeconomic aspects. In M. Bruno & B. Pleskovic (Eds.), Annual World Bank conference on development economics 1995 (pp. 295–330). Washington: The World Bank.
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics
Treisman, D. (2002a). Decentralization and the quality of government.
Unpublished paper. Los Angeles: University of California. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/defin.pdf/
Treisman, D. (2002b). Defining and measuring decentralization: a global perspective.
Unpublished paper. Los Angeles: University of California. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/DecandGovt.pdf
Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research? Annual Review of Political Science
U.S. Department of Justice (1989, 1999, 2007). Public Integrity Section Criminal Division. Report to Congress on the activities and operations of the Public Integrity Section.
World Bank (1999). Decentralization: rethinking government. In World development report 1999/2000: entering the 21st century (pp. 107–124). New York: Oxford University Press.