Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons
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This paper highlights important lessons gained from the research program of Elinor Ostrom, and demonstrates the close connection between public choice and the work on collective management of the commons for which Lin was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. Although our primary focus is on Lin’s research on self-governance and the “commons,” an overarching goal is to capture the intellectual journey of participants in the Ostrom Workshop, who continue to be guided by the inspiring examples set by Lin and Vincent Ostrom.
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- Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons
Volume 143, Issue 3-4 , pp 293-301
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- 1. Department of Political Science, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA
- 2. Department of Economics, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA