Buying supermajorities in a stochastic environment Authors Patrick Hummel Graduate School of Business Stanford University Article
First Online: 09 May 2009 Received: 11 December 2008 Accepted: 06 May 2009 DOI :
10.1007/s11127-009-9456-5
Cite this article as: Hummel, P. Public Choice (2009) 141: 351. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9456-5
Abstract This paper considers a model in which two opposing lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators, but the precise preferences of the legislators are not known. I show that, in contrast to the normally predicted effect of uncertainty on the formation of supermajorities, in the presence of competing lobbyists, increased risk that members of a lobbyist’s coalition will not vote for the proposal may decrease the number of legislators a lobbyist includes in her coalition.
Keywords Lobbying Supermajorities Uncertainty
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