Public Choice

, Volume 136, Issue 1, pp 215–239

Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9292-z

Cite this article as:
Houser, D. & Stratmann, T. Public Choice (2008) 136: 215. doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9292-z

Abstract

Campaign advertising can provide benefits to constituencies when used to fund the distribution of useful information, but voters can be harmed if candidates finance such advertising by trading policy favors to special interests in exchange for contributions. We report data from novel laboratory campaign finance experiments that shed light on this tradeoff, and that provide rigorous empirical evidence on formal campaign finance theory. Our key finding is that voters respond to advertising differently between special interest and publicly-financed campaigns, and that the nature of this difference is qualitatively consistent with formal models’ predictions.

Keywords

Campaign contribution limitsCampaign financePublic financePolitical advertisingExperiments

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic ScienceGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Center for Study of Public ChoiceGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA