On the Causes and Consequences of Ballot Order Effects
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We investigate the effect of ballot order on the outcomes of California city council and school board elections. Candidates listed first win office between four and five percentage points more often than expected absent order effects. This first candidate advantage is larger in races with more candidates and for higher quality candidates. The first candidate advantage is similar across contexts: the magnitude of the effect is not statistically distinguishable in city council and in school board elections, in races with and without an open seat, and in races consolidated and not consolidated with statewide general elections. Standard satisficing models cannot fully explain ballot order effects in our dataset of multi-winner elections.
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- On the Causes and Consequences of Ballot Order Effects
Volume 35, Issue 1 , pp 175-197
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- Ballot order effects
- School boards
- City council
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, 208 S. 37th Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19104-6215, USA
- 2. Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA