Philosophical Studies

, Volume 167, Issue 1, pp 119–139

A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-013-0235-2

Cite this article as:
Sud, R. Philos Stud (2014) 167: 119. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0235-2

Abstract

Adam Elga (Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(5), 1–11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga’s argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle that is more difficult for imprecise Bayesians to avoid.

Keywords

Formal epistemology Decision theory Imprecise credences 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MichiganAnn ArborUSA