Abstract
T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s being sensitive to outcome luck, it cannot justify allocating blame differently when agents with the same attitudes differ only with respect to the luck-based outcomes of their actions. However, Scanlon’s own contractualist theory of morality can be invoked to show that the double attitude account is compatible with blame-based sanctions (e.g., compensation mandated when negligence or reckless result in harm) being sensitive to outcome luck. The resultant view of blame and luck remains desert-based while making sense of the common intuition that differences in outcome luck can matter to how lucky and unlucky individuals are justifiably treated.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I will focus on blame as a moral phenomenon, i.e., blame directed at individuals for perceived moral shortcomings. This does not preclude blame being directed at individuals for non-moral shortcomings, such as imprudence.
Nagel (1979, pp. 29–31) uses the term resultant luck.
As an anonymous reviewer points out, the greater impairment in their relationship with D could be non-moral, but in that case, it would fall outside of Scanlon’s account of blame.
Scanlon first broaches the topic of outcome luck by proposing that an “adequate account of blame should either explain how blame can vary” in response to outcome luck or “else give a convincing explanation of why it should appear to do so even though it does not” (Scanlon 2008, p. 126). That outcome luck matters to blame at all is a thesis Scanlon appears to assume.
See for instance Alexander and Kessler Ferzan (2009).
I take no stand here on the value of compensation that should be provided in such cases. As Waldron (1995, p. 389) notes, the question of how much compensation should be provided to those who suffer undeserved losses is partially independent of the question of who bears the moral obligations to provide this compensation.
Noting again the epistemic obstacles to identifying individuals like C, since their recklessness may go unnoticed precisely because it harms no one.
Cf. Scanlon’s appeal (2008, p. 208) to generic costs and benefits when considering the justifiability of principles of mutual aid.
I take these conclusions to be similar to Walen’s proposal (2010, pp. 379–382) that individuals take “primary ownership” of their moral luck.
From a legal perspective, my proposal concerning blame-based sanctions is most naturally seen as a proposal regarding civil liability. To the extent that criminal sanctions more closely track moral blameworthiness, it might appear that the regime of sanctions I propose would have no place in the criminal law, given that (as I have argued) individuals like C and D are equally morally blameworthy. However, it is possible to envision my blame-based sanctions as manifest in criminal penalties, akin to fines, such that individuals like D are subject to fines that individuals like C are not.
References
Alexander, L., & Kessler Ferzan, K. (2009). Crime and culpability: A theory of criminal law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Darwall, S. (2006). The second-person standpoint: Morality, respect, and accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Pascu, I., & Cullen, M. (2012). How general are risk preferences? Choices under uncertainty in different domains. American Economic Review, 102, 2606–2638.
Jensen, H. (1984). Morality and luck. Philosophy, 59(229), 323–330.
Latus, A. (2000). Moral and epistemic luck. Journal of Philosophical Research, 25, 149–172.
Nagel, T. (1979). Moral luck. In Mortal questions (pp. 24–38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nicholson, N., Fenton-O’Creevy, M., Soane, E., & Willman, P. (2001) Risk propensity and personality. London Business School Working Papers. http://www.london.edu/facultyandresearch/research/docs/risk.ps.pdf, Retrieved July 31, 2013.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (2008). Moral dimensions: Meaning, permissibility, and blame. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Strawson, P. F. (1974) Freedom and resentment. In Freedom and resentment and other essays (pp. 1–29). London: Methuen.
Thomson, J. J. (1993). Morality and back luck. In D. Statman (Ed.), Moral luck (pp. 195–216). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–458.
Waldron, J. (1995). Moments of carelessness and massive loss. In D. Owen (Ed.), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (pp. 387–408). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walen, A. (2010). Crime, culpability, and moral luck. Law and Philosophy, 29, 373–384.
Weber, E. U., Blais, A., & Betz, N. E. (2002). A domain-specific risk-attitude scale: Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of Sanctional Decision Making, 15, 263–290.
Acknowledgments
A number of colleagues provided valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article, including David Adams, Carl Cranor, John Davis, Kory de Clark, Margaret Gilbert, Aaron James, Steve Munzer, Peter Ross, Michael Smith, and Rivka Weinberg. I also gratefully acknowledge the feedback of an anonymous Philosophical Studies reviewer.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cholbi, M. Luck, blame, and desert. Philos Stud 169, 313–332 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0183-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0183-x