Abstract
I argue that the accounts of inference recently presented (in this journal) by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and Crispin Wright are unsatisfactory. I proceed in two steps: First, in Sects. 1 and 2, I argue that we should not accept what Boghossian calls the “Taking Condition on inference” as a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. I present a different condition of adequacy and argue that it is superior to the one offered by Boghossian. More precisely, I point out that there is an analog of Moore’s Paradox for inference; and I suggest that explaining this phenomenon is a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. Boghossian’s Taking Condition derives its plausibility from the fact that it apparently explains the analog of Moore’s Paradox. Second, in Sect. 3, I show that neither Boghossian’s, nor Broome’s, nor Wright’s account of inference meets my condition of adequacy. I distinguish two kinds of mistake one is likely to make if one does not focus on my condition of adequacy; and I argue that all three—Boghossian, Broome, and Wright—make at least one of these mistakes.
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Notes
I use “doing” in such a way that there are doings that are not intentional actions. Hence, I am not taking a stand on whether inferrings are intentional actions.
There might be various respects in which the phenomenon I mention is broader than it seems from what I have said. Maybe there are analogues of (IMP) for all acts of rationality, e.g., perception. I am not taking a stand on this question. Moreover, it is perhaps irrational to be open-minded about the goodness of an inference one makes. Thus, a judgment might not be necessary. These are important questions, but I cannot address them here.
This is how it seems to me from Broome’s unpublished manuscript “Rationality Through Reasoning.”.
In fact, the situation seems even worse to me: It seems to me that if we want to analyze the notion of acting for a reason, we will most likely end up appealing to the notion of (practical) inferring. This should be familiar from many authors writing on acting for reasons (cf. Anscombe 2000, §33; Harman 1986; Sellars 1973). In fact, Wright himself seems to make use of this idea in the passage just quoted when he talks about the practical syllogism. Hence, there is a serious danger that we are moving in a circle.
It might be objected that (IMP) is not an essential truth about inferring but merely reveals something about the concept of a good inference. Someone might, for example, hold that it is part of the possession-conditions of this concept that one does not make inferences one believes not to be good; or maybe there is something about the possession of the concept “good inference” that makes it the case that if one believes that an inference is not good, it is irrational for one to make that inference. This objection fails, however, because the tension between inferring P from Q and believing that the inference from Q to P is not a good inference does not require that both acts occur in the same subject. If person A infers P from Q, person B can criticize A by saying, “But the inference from Q to P is not a good inference.” And this criticism might be appropriate (especially when uttered in a conversation with a third party) even if A does not possess the concept “good inference.” Moreover, what makes this criticism appropriate is, in part, A’s making the inference and not merely B’s possession or exercise of the concept “good inference.” (IMP) is a truth about the relation between inferring and the exercise of the concept “good inference”; and this (potential) relation is essential for both relata—not just for one of them. Nothing is an inferring if (IMP) does not hold of it (given that the thinker has the concept of a good inference).
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2000). Intention (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Boghossian, P. A. (2003). Blind reasoning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 77(1), 225–248.
Boghossian, P. A. (2012). What is inference? Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9903-x.
Broome, J. (2012). Comments on Boghossian. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9894-7.
Harman, G. H. (1986). Change in view: principles of reasoning. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Sellars, W. (1973). Actions and events. Noûs, 7(2), 179–202.
Wright, C. (2012). Comment on Paul Boghossian, “The nature of inference”. Philosophical Studies, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9892-9.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Crispin Wright, Chris Peacocke, Bob Brandom, James Shaw, Kieran Setiya, Jack Woods and the audience at the graduate student workshop in philosophy at Columbia University for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Hlobil, U. Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference. Philos Stud 167, 419–429 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0104-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0104-z