Philosophical Studies

, Volume 169, Issue 1, pp 59-69

First online:

The disappearing agent objection to event-causal libertarianism

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The question I raise is whether Mark Balaguer’s event-causal libertarianism can withstand the disappearing agent objection. The concern is that with the causal role of the events antecedent to a decision already given, nothing settles whether the decision occurs, and so the agent does not settle whether the decision occurs. Thus it would seem that in this view the agent will not have the control in making decisions required for moral responsibility. I examine whether Balaguer’s position has the resources to answer this objection.


Event-causal libertarianism Non-causal libertarianism Disappearing agent objection Indeterminism Moral responsibility