A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation
- Nevin Climenhaga
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Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) − P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the confirmation afforded to H by E2. I present several examples that demonstrate the unacceptability of this result, and conclude that we should reject s (and other measures that share this feature) as a measure of confirmation.
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- A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation
Volume 164, Issue 3 , pp 643-651
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Bayesian epistemology
- Nevin Climenhaga (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA