Philosophical Studies

, Volume 164, Issue 3, pp 643–651

A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-9872-0

Cite this article as:
Climenhaga, N. Philos Stud (2013) 164: 643. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9872-0
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Abstract

Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) − P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the confirmation afforded to H by E2. I present several examples that demonstrate the unacceptability of this result, and conclude that we should reject s (and other measures that share this feature) as a measure of confirmation.

Keywords

ConfirmationEvidenceBayesian epistemologyProbability

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Notre DameNotre DameUSA