Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition
- Paul Silva Jr.
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An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary value.
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- Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition
Volume 164, Issue 3 , pp 579-589
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Philosophical methodology
- Self-defeating arguments
- Paul Silva Jr. (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, 06269, USA