Autonomy and false beliefs
- Suzy Killmister
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what the agent is reflecting upon. Whichever of these current formulations of autonomy we accept, reflection could be undertaken in full accordance with the conditions set, and yet the action fail to be autonomous. This will occur, I argue, if the agent is mistaken about the object of her reflection. More precisely, if she has a particular kind of false belief about the action she is contemplating undertaking, then no amount of reflection can render that action autonomous. This suggests the need for externalist conditions to be incorporated into an account of autonomy.
- Arpaly, N. (2005). Responsibility, applied ethics, and complex autonomy theories. In J. Taylor (Ed.), Personal autonomy: New essays on personal autonomy and its role in contemporary moral philosophy (pp. 162–180). New York: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Benson, P. (1994). Free agency and self-worth. The Journal of Philosophy, 91(12), 650–668. CrossRef
- Bratman, M. (2000). Reflection, planning, and temporally extended agency. The Philosophical Review, 109(1), 35.
- Christman, J. (1991). Autonomy and personal history. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21(1), 1–24.
- Christman, J. (2009). The politics of persons: Individual autonomy and socio-historical selves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Dillon, R. S. (1997). Self-respect: Moral, emotional, political. Ethics, 107(2), 226–249. CrossRef
- Dworkin, G. (1988). The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Ekstrom, L. (1993). A coherence theory of autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53(3), 599–616. CrossRef
- Elster, J. (1985). Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23), 829–839. CrossRef
- Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), 5–20. CrossRef
- Govier, T. (1993). Self trust, autonomy, and self esteem. Hypatia, 8(1), 99–120. CrossRef
- Hill, T. E. (1991). Autonomy and self-respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- James, W. (2010). The will to believe. In G. Oppy & M. Scott (Eds.), Reading philosophy of religion (pp. 145–183). New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Kawall, J. (2010). Autonomy, agency, and the value of enduring beliefs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40(1), 107–129. CrossRef
- Levy, N. (2006). Autonomy and addiction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36(3), 427–447. CrossRef
- McKenna, M. (2005). The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency. In J. S. Taylor (Ed.), Personal autonomy: New essays on personal autonomy and its role in contemporary moral philosophy (pp. 205–234). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- McLeod, C. (2002). Self-trust and reproductive autonomy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Mele, A. (1995). Autonomous agents: From self-control to autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Meyers, D. T. (1989). Self, society, and personal choice. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Meyers, D. T. (2005). Decentralizing autonomy five faces of selfhood. In J. Christman & J. Anderson (Eds.), Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism: New essays (p. 27). New York: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Savulescu, J., & Momeyer, R. W. (1997). Should informed consent be based on rational beliefs? Journal of Medical Ethics, 23(5), 282–288. CrossRef
- Stoljar, N. (2000). Autonomy and the feminist intuition. In C. Mackenzie & N. Stoljar (Eds.), Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self (pp. 94–111). New York: Oxford Univeristy Press.
- Autonomy and false beliefs
Volume 164, Issue 2 , pp 513-531
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- False beliefs
- Suzy Killmister (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Politics Programme, School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, Private Bag 11-222, Palmerston North, New Zealand