Philosophical Studies

, Volume 164, Issue 2, pp 405–418

Visual prominence and representationalism

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyOberlin College
  • Ben Bronner
    • Department of PhilosophyOberlin College
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-9853-3

Cite this article as:
Ganson, T. & Bronner, B. Philos Stud (2013) 164: 405. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9853-3

Abstract

A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.

Keywords

Attention Representationalism Determinacy of representation Visual prominence

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012