Philosophical Studies

, Volume 164, Issue 2, pp 405-418

First online:

Visual prominence and representationalism

  • Todd GansonAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Oberlin College Email author 
  • , Ben BronnerAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Oberlin College

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A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.


Attention Representationalism Determinacy of representation Visual prominence