Philosophical Studies

, Volume 166, Issue 2, pp 231–242

Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0035-0

Cite this article as:
Snedegar, J. Philos Stud (2013) 166: 231. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0035-0

Abstract

Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason for that action out of a different set of alternatives.

Keywords

ContrastivismReasonsReason ascriptionsPractical reasoning

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Mudd Hall of PhilosophyUniversity of Southern CaliforniaLos AngelesUSA