The evidential relevance of self-locating information
- Kai Draper
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Philosophical interest in the role of self-locating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is 1/3, various attractive views on confirmation and probabilistic reasoning appear to be undermined; and some writers have used the problem as a basis for rejecting some of those views. My interest here is in two such views. One of them is the thesis that self-locating information cannot be evidentially relevant to a non-self-locating hypothesis. The other, a basic tenet of Bayesian confirmation theory, is the thesis that an ideally rational agent updates her credence in a non-self-locating hypothesis in response to new information only by conditionalization. I argue that we can disprove these two theses by way of cases that are much less puzzling than Sleeping Beauty. I present two such cases in this paper.
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- The evidential relevance of self-locating information
Volume 166, Issue 1 , pp 185-202
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Sleeping Beauty problem
- Self-locating belief
- Kai Draper (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, 24 Kent Way, Newark, DE, 19716, USA