Philosophical Studies

, Volume 166, Issue 1, pp 185–202

The evidential relevance of self-locating information

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Delaware
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0033-2

Cite this article as:
Draper, K. Philos Stud (2013) 166: 185. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0033-2

Abstract

Philosophical interest in the role of self-locating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is 1/3, various attractive views on confirmation and probabilistic reasoning appear to be undermined; and some writers have used the problem as a basis for rejecting some of those views. My interest here is in two such views. One of them is the thesis that self-locating information cannot be evidentially relevant to a non-self-locating hypothesis. The other, a basic tenet of Bayesian confirmation theory, is the thesis that an ideally rational agent updates her credence in a non-self-locating hypothesis in response to new information only by conditionalization. I argue that we can disprove these two theses by way of cases that are much less puzzling than Sleeping Beauty. I present two such cases in this paper.

Keywords

Sleeping Beauty problemSelf-locating beliefConditionalization

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012