On non-pragmatic Millianism
- Andrea Onofri
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Speakers often judge the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman flies” to be true and the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies” to be false. If Millianism is true, however, these sentences express the very same proposition and must therefore have same truth value. “Pragmatic” Millians like Salmon and Soames have tried to explain speakers’ “anti-substitution intuitions” by claiming that the two sentences are routinely used to pragmatically convey different propositions which do have different truth values. “Non-Pragmatic” Millians like Braun, on the other hand, have argued that the Millian should not appeal to pragmatics and opt instead for a purely psychological explanation. I will present two objections against Non-Pragmatic Millianism. The first one is that the view cannot account for the intuitions of speakers who accept the identity sentence “Superman is Clark Kent”: applying a psychological account in this case, I will argue, would yield wrong predictions about speakers who resist substitution with simple sentences. I will then consider a possible response from the non-pragmatic Millian and show that the response would in fact require an appeal to pragmatics. My conclusion will be that Braun’s psychological explanation of anti-substitution intuitions is untenable, and that the Millian is therefore forced to adopt a pragmatic account. My second objection is that Non-Pragmatic Millianism cannot account for the role that certain commonsense intentional generalizations play in the explanation of behavior. I will consider a reply offered by Braun and argue that it still leaves out a large class of important generalizations. My conclusion will be that Braun’s non-pragmatic strategy fails, and that the Millian will again be forced to adopt a pragmatic account of intentional generalizations if he wants to respond to the objection. In light of my two objections, my general conclusion will be that non-pragmatic versions of Millianism should be rejected. This has an important consequence: if Millianism is true, then some pragmatic Millian account must be correct. It follows that, if standard objections against pragmatic accounts succeed, then Millianism must be rejected altogether.
- Braun, D. (1998). Understanding belief reports. Philosophical Review, 107(4), 555–595. CrossRef
- Braun, D. (2000). Russellianism and psychological generalizations. Nous, 34(2), 203–236. CrossRef
- Braun, D. (2001a). Russellianism and prediction. Philosophical Studies, 105(1), 59–105. CrossRef
- Braun, D. (2001b). Russellianism and explanation. Nous, 35(s15), 253–289. CrossRef
- Braun, D. (2006). Illogical, but rational. Noûs, 40(2), 376–379. CrossRef
- Braun, D., & Saul, J. (2002). Simple sentences, substitution, and mistaken evaluations. Philosophical Studies, 111(1), 1–41. CrossRef
- Braun, D., & Sider, T. (2006). Kripke’s revenge. Philosophical Studies, 128(3), 669–682. CrossRef
- Crimmins, M., & Perry, J. (1989). The prince and the phone booth: reporting puzzling beliefs. Journal of Philosophy, 86(12), 685–711. CrossRef
- Fodor, J. A. (1994). The elm and the expert. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Prinz, J. (2002). Furnishing the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Richard, M. (1990). Propositional attitudes: An essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Richard, M. (1997). What does commonsense psychology tell us about meaning? Nous, 31(1), 87–114. CrossRef
- Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Salmon, N. (1989). Illogical belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 3, 243–285. CrossRef
- Salmon, N. (2006). The resilience of illogical belief. Noûs, 40(2), 369–375. CrossRef
- Saul, J. (1998). The pragmatics of attitude ascriptions. Philosophical Studies, 92(3), 363–389. CrossRef
- Schiffer, S. (1987). The ‘Fido’-Fido theory of belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 1, 455–480. CrossRef
- Schiffer, S. (1990). The mode-of-presentation problem. In C. Anderson & J. Owens (Eds.), Propositional attitudes. Stanford: CSLI.
- Schiffer, S. (2006). A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports. Noûs, 40(2), 361–368. CrossRef
- Schneider, S. (2005). Direct reference, psychological explanation, and frege cases. Mind and Language, 20(4), 423–447. CrossRef
- Soames, S. (1987). Substitutivity. In J. Thomson (Ed.), On being and saying (pp. 99–132). Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Soames, S. (1995). Beyond singular propositions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25(4), 515–549.
- Soames, S. (2002). Beyond rigidity: The unfinished semantic agenda of naming and necessity. New York: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- On non-pragmatic Millianism
Volume 166, Issue 2 , pp 305-327
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Psychological explanation
- Anti-substitution intuitions
- Intentional generalizations
- Ceteris paribus generalizations
- Explanation of behavior
- Andrea Onofri (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Arché-Philosophical Research Centre, University of St. Andrews, 17-19 College Street, St. Andrews, KY16 9AL, UK