Turri, J. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 791. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9846-7
I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections.
InfinitismFinite-mind objectionEpistemic normativityEpistemic justificationPeter KleinAdam PodlaskowskiJoshua Smith