On fineness of grain
- Jeffrey C. King
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A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose. Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated. An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objections to the effect that the account individuates propositions too finely are raised and responses to the objections are provided. It is also shown that theories that try to individuate propositions less finely have serious problems.
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- On fineness of grain
Volume 163, Issue 3 , pp 763-781
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Propositional attitudes
- Possible worlds
- Structured propositions
- Jeffrey C. King (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 1 Seminary Place, New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, USA