LOGOS-Grup de Recerca en Lógica, Llenguatge i Cognició, Facultat de Filosofia, Universitat de Barcelona
Cite this article as:
Schulz, M. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 673. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9838-7
A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations.