Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 3, pp 673–682

Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9838-7

Cite this article as:
Schulz, M. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 673. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9838-7


A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations.


Indicative conditionals Epistemic modals Modalised conditionals Suppositional view 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LOGOS-Grup de Recerca en Lógica, Llenguatge i Cognició, Facultat de Filosofia, Universitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

Personalised recommendations