Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer
First Online: 09 December 2011 DOI:
10.1007/s11098-011-9838-7 Cite this article as: Schulz, M. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 673. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9838-7 Abstract
A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386,
) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2010 ) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations. 2011 Keywords Indicative conditionals Epistemic modals Modalised conditionals Suppositional view References
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