Agent-neutral deontology Authors
First Online: 30 October 2011 DOI:
Cite this article as: Dougherty, T. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 527. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9829-8 Abstract
According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that
she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook View. Keywords Consequentialism Deontology Agent-relative Agent-neutral Constraint Axiology References
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