Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 2, pp 453–457

A defence of Owens’ exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims

Authors

  • Ema Sullivan-Bissett
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of York
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of York
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9824-0

Cite this article as:
Sullivan-Bissett, E. & Noordhof, P. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 453. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9824-0

Abstract

In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into this process of deliberation, he has not, contra Steglich-Petersen, already adopted the truth aim with regard to p. In closing, we further suggest that proponents of the truth aim hypothesis need to focus on aim-guidance, not mere aim attribution, for their approach to have explanatory utility so underlining the significance of Owens’ argument.

Keywords

BeliefAimTruth

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011